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web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit

Passive, non-destructive web perimeter security auditing mapped to OWASP Top 10:2025 surface leads, CDN Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (X-Forwarded-Host), supply chain manifest exposure, git object dumping prevention (/.git/HEAD), cryptographic headers, and AI crawler boundary governance (llms.txt, robots.txt). Use when auditing production domains, configuring Cloudflare/Vercel/Nginx edge security, or preparing pre-launch perimeter checks.
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Web Perimeter Security Audit (OWASP Top 10:2025 Surface Leads)

Conduct non-destructive, deterministic perimeter security audits against web applications, APIs, and CDN edges. Map observable edge findings to relevant OWASP Top 10:2025 categories as perimeter leads, and verify fixes with reproducible checks before shipping to production.

Scope & Unverified Application-Layer Areas

External HTTP response headers, CDN cache behavior, crawler policies, and disclosure files only inspect the publicly observable edge perimeter. Passing this checklist does not establish full OWASP Top 10:2025 compliance. Always report the following application-layer areas as unverified by perimeter probing unless backed by separate code review and authenticated testing:

  • Authorization & Object-Level Access Control (A01:2025): BOLA/IDOR, tenant isolation, and privilege escalation require authenticated multi-role integration tests (OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet).
  • Authentication & Session Lifecycle (A07:2025): MFA enforcement, credential stuffing defenses, token rotation, and server-side session revocation cannot be proven from Set-Cookie flags alone (OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet).
  • Injection & Business Logic Processing (A05 / A06:2025): SQL/NoSQL/command injection, SSRF, and race conditions require source analysis (SAST) and targeted DAST (OWASP Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet).
  • Internal Security Logging & Alerting (A09:2025): Audit trail completeness, tamper resistance, and SIEM alerting must be verified inside the telemetry pipeline (OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet).

Important Safety Contract

  • Never send destructive payloads, brute-force traffic, or unisolated cache-poisoning probes against shared production cache keys.
  • Before sending any X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Scheme probe against a live target, first prove query-key isolation using fresh, validated hexadecimal cache-busters (set -euo pipefail, CB_A=$(openssl rand -hex 8) and CB_B=$(openssl rand -hex 8)):
    1. Fail closed before sending any request if CB_A or CB_B is empty, equal, or does not match ^[0-9a-f]{16}$.
    2. Send a clean request with ?__cb=${CB_A} (--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5), repeat the identical ?__cb=${CB_A} request at most twice (max 3 requests total, --max-time 5 each) to confirm a cache HIT, and then send a single clean request with ?__cb=${CB_B} (--max-time 5) and verify it produces a cache MISS.
    3. If HIT followed by MISS is not confirmed within those bounded attempts, abort the live probe and run it only against an isolated staging environment.
  • Use a private mktemp -d working directory with trap cleanup for all captured headers and bodies; never write to predictable shared /tmp filenames.
  • Verify real HTTP responses rather than relying on framework defaults; reverse proxies and CDNs frequently strip or override upstream headers.
  • Treat 403 Forbidden on directory roots (such as /.git/) as insufficient unless direct object paths (/.git/HEAD, /.git/config) also return 404/403.
  • Keep all checks local by default (curl / standard system tools). Only invoke external CLIs or remote scorecard APIs when the user explicitly opts in and approves sharing the target hostname.

When to Activate

  • Auditing a live domain or staging environment before launch
  • Reviewing Cloudflare, Vercel, AWS CloudFront, Nginx, or Next.js middleware security configurations
  • Investigating CDN Web Cache Poisoning (X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Scheme) or CORS origin reflection
  • Hardening supply chain artifacts (package-lock.json, /.npmrc, /.yarnrc.yml, source maps) and AI crawler boundaries (llms.txt, robots.txt, security.txt)

Perimeter Audit Workflow

1. Exposed Artifacts, CORS & Cache Isolation Leads (Related to A01 / A02:2025)

  1. Direct Git Object & Config Artifact Exposure (git-dumper vector):
    • Disabling directory indexing on /.git/ (403 Forbidden) does not prevent repository reconstruction if direct object paths remain readable.
    • Probe each path using a bounded, file-specific signature (--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5) without printing sensitive contents:
      • /.git/HEAD: check if status is 200 and the first line matches ^ref: refs/ or a 40-character hex SHA (^[0-9a-f]{40}$).
      • /.git/config: check if status is 200 and the body contains [core] or a [remote " section header.
      • /docker-compose.yml: check if status is 200 and the body contains a top-level services: block.
      • Environment configuration paths (such as /<dotenv-artifact>): check if status is 200 and lines match ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+= without <!DOCTYPE or <html, reporting only a boolean detection signal and never echoing secret values.
  2. CORS Arbitrary Origin Reflection:
    • Send Origin: https://evil-probe.invalid with --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5.
    • If the response reflects Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil-probe.invalid together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, record it as a HIGH-priority perimeter lead. Verify whether the endpoint serves authenticated or non-public user data in a browser context before escalating to CRITICAL (public endpoints that return identical unauthenticated content regardless of cookies are a lower-severity misconfiguration).
  3. Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (Bounded Probe & Local Staging Fixture):
    • Only after proving query-key isolation (?__cb=${CB_A} reaches HIT within 3 bounded requests while ?__cb=${CB_B} returns MISS) or on an isolated staging host, run the bounded probe inside a private temporary directory:
      set -euo pipefail
      CB_A="$(openssl rand -hex 8)"
      CB_B="$(openssl rand -hex 8)"
      if [[ ! "${CB_A}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ ]] || [[ ! "${CB_B}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ ]] || [[ "${CB_A}" == "${CB_B}" ]]; then
        echo "Fail closed: invalid cache-buster entropy" >&2
        exit 1
      fi
      
      WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
      trap 'rm -rf "${WORK_DIR}"' EXIT
      
      TARGET_BASE="https://example.com/"
      # Step 1: Prove query-key isolation (max 3 attempts for HIT on CB_A, then MISS on CB_B)
      CACHE_HIT=0
      for attempt in 1 2 3; do
        curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 -D "${WORK_DIR}/iso_a_headers.txt" -o /dev/null "${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_A}"
        if grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:\s*HIT|x-cache:\s*Hit|age:\s*[1-9])' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_a_headers.txt"; then
          CACHE_HIT=1
          break
        fi
      done
      curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 -D "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt" -o /dev/null "${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_B}"
      if [[ "${CACHE_HIT}" -ne 1 ]] || ! grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:[[:space:]]*MISS([[:space:]]|$)|x-cache:[[:space:]]*Miss([[:space:]]|$))' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt" || grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:[[:space:]]*HIT|x-cache:[[:space:]]*Hit|age:[[:space:]]*[1-9])' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt"; then
        echo "Aborting live probe: query-key cache isolation not proven; use isolated staging." >&2
        exit 1
      fi
      
      # Step 2: Isolated GET probe on a fresh cache-buster key
      CB_PROBE="$(openssl rand -hex 8)"
      [[ "${CB_PROBE}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ && "${CB_PROBE}" != "${CB_A}" && "${CB_PROBE}" != "${CB_B}" ]] || exit 1
      PROBE_URL="${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_PROBE}"
      
      curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 \
        -D "${WORK_DIR}/probe_headers.txt" -o "${WORK_DIR}/probe_body.txt" "${PROBE_URL}" \
        -H "X-Forwarded-Host: cache-probe.invalid" \
        -H "X-Forwarded-Scheme: nothttps"
      
      # Step 3: Clean follow-up GET to the identical URL without probe headers
      curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 \
        -D "${WORK_DIR}/clean_headers.txt" -o "${WORK_DIR}/clean_body.txt" "${PROBE_URL}"
      
    • Flag MEDIUM (Unkeyed Input Reflection) if cache-probe.invalid appears in ${WORK_DIR}/probe_headers.txt (Location) or ${WORK_DIR}/probe_body.txt on the first request alone.
    • Escalate to HIGH (Confirmed Web Cache Poisoning) only when the subsequent clean follow-up request (${WORK_DIR}/clean_headers.txt and ${WORK_DIR}/clean_body.txt) is served from cache (CF-Cache-Status: HIT, X-Cache: Hit from cloudfront, or Age > 0) and replays the injected cache-probe.invalid reflection or poisoned 4xx/5xx status.
    • Self-Contained Local Staging Fixture (Positive Replay vs. Negative Control): To validate your detection logic locally without touching external networks, run this loopback fixture:
      python3 - << 'EOF'
      import http.server, threading, urllib.request
      
      STORE = {}
      class EdgeFixture(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
          def log_message(self, *args): pass
          def do_GET(self):
              mode, _, query = self.path.partition("?")
              xfh = self.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Host", "clean.example")
              # /vulnerable caches by query only (unkeyed X-Forwarded-Host)
              # /safe includes X-Forwarded-Host in the cache key (negative control)
              key = (mode, query) if mode == "/vulnerable" else (mode, query, xfh)
              if key in STORE:
                  body, hit = STORE[key], "HIT"
              else:
                  body = f"<link href='https://{xfh}/app.js'>".encode()
                  STORE[key], hit = body, "MISS"
              self.send_response(200)
              self.send_header("CF-Cache-Status", hit)
              self.end_headers()
              self.wfile.write(body)
      
      srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), EdgeFixture)
      port = srv.server_port
      threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
      
      def check_path(path):
          url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}{path}?__cb=deadbeef01234567"
          req1 = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"X-Forwarded-Host": "cache-probe.invalid"})
          urllib.request.urlopen(req1, timeout=3).read()
          resp2 = urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=3)
          body2 = resp2.read().decode()
          hit2 = resp2.headers.get("CF-Cache-Status")
          return hit2 == "HIT" and "cache-probe.invalid" in body2
      
      assert check_path("/vulnerable") is True, "Expected positive replay detection on /vulnerable"
      assert check_path("/safe") is False, "Expected negative control to stay clean on /safe"
      srv.shutdown()
      print("Staging fixture verified: positive replay detected and negative control clean.")
      EOF
      

2. Software Supply Chain & Integrity Leads (Related to A03 / A08:2025)

  1. Public Lockfile & Registry Config Exposure:
    • Verify that /package.json, /package-lock.json, /pnpm-lock.yaml, and /yarn.lock return 404 or 403 in production so attackers cannot harvest your exact dependency tree (SBOM).
    • Explicitly probe /.npmrc and /.yarnrc.yml using bounded, non-exfiltrating signatures (--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5): check whether HTTP status is 200 and lines match ^(registry|@[a-z0-9_-]+:registry|//[^:]+:_authToken|npmScopes:|npmRegistries:|npmAuthToken:|nodeLinker:) without <!DOCTYPE or <html. Report only the HTTP status code and boolean detection result; never print configuration contents or token values.
  2. Production Source Maps & Subresource Integrity (SRI):
    • Check whether production JavaScript bundles expose .js.map files containing original TypeScript/business logic.
    • Require integrity="sha384-..." and crossorigin="anonymous" on third-party <script> tags loaded from external CDNs.

3. Transport & Browser Policy Leads (Related to A04 / A05:2025)

  1. Conditional Strict Transport Security (HSTS) & TLS Posture:
    • Verify that plain http:// redirects immediately (301/308) to https:// and that HTTPS responses include Strict-Transport-Security with an appropriate max-age (e.g., max-age=31536000).
    • Treat includeSubDomains and preload as conditional deployment decisions, not universal defaults:
      • Only add includeSubDomains after confirming that every subdomain under the registered domain supports valid HTTPS; otherwise browsers will refuse connections to HTTP-only internal or legacy subdomains.
      • Keep preload submission a separate, explicit operational decision after reviewing the HSTS preload requirements, because removal from browser preload lists takes months to propagate.
  2. Content-Security-Policy (CSP) Evaluation:
    • Verify that Content-Security-Policy defines default-src, script-src, object-src 'none', base-uri 'self', and frame-ancestors.
    • Flag script-src 'unsafe-eval' independently whenever present, because cryptographic nonces ('nonce-...') and hashes ('sha256-...') only neutralize 'unsafe-inline' and do not disable eval() or string-to-code execution.
    • Flag script-src 'unsafe-inline' unless accompanied by 'strict-dynamic' or per-response nonces/hashes (and no unsafe-inline fallback in modern browsers).

4. Crawler Boundary & Session Cookie Leads (Related to A06 / A07:2025)

  1. AI Crawler & Agentic Boundary Governance:
    • Verify whether robots.txt explicitly defines rules for AI crawlers (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended, CCBot) and whether /llms.txt or /.well-known/agent.json declares machine-readable usage policies.
    • Because attackers routinely spoof User-Agent: ChatGPT-User or Googlebot to bypass naive WAF rules, never trust User-Agent strings alone: verify crawlers using Forward-Confirmed Reverse DNS (FCrDNS) (PTR lookup on the client IP followed by a forward A/AAAA lookup confirming the IP matches the official domain), official published IP CIDR lists (e.g., OpenAI/Anthropic IP ranges), or cryptographic HTTP message signatures (RFC 9421 Web Bot Auth).
  2. Session Cookie Hardening (Perimeter Surface):
    • Every Set-Cookie header carrying an authentication or session identifier must include HttpOnly and Secure.
    • Evaluate SameSite and lifetime against the application's architecture:
      • Default to SameSite=Lax (or Strict) for first-party flows; only permit SameSite=None; Secure when intentional cross-site embedding/federation is required and explicit anti-CSRF tokens or Fetch Metadata (Sec-Fetch-Site) checks are enforced.
      • Ephemeral browser-session cookies may intentionally omit Max-Age and Expires so they clear on browser close; persistent cookies must set a bounded Max-Age or Expires appropriate to the session risk tier.

5. Error Surface & Disclosure Policy Leads (Related to A09 / A10:2025)

  1. Fail-Closed Error Handling (No Stack Trace Leaks):
    • Request a non-existent route (/api/__probe_404_<random>) with --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 and verify that the server returns a clean, minimal JSON or HTML error without leaking stack traces (java.sql.SQLException, PrismaClientKnownRequestError, Traceback, at Object.<anonymous>, /var/task/, node_modules/).
  2. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (/.well-known/security.txt):
    • Verify RFC 9116 compliance (Contact: and non-expired Expires: fields) at /.well-known/security.txt.

Optional External Verification (Explicit Opt-In Only)

By default, perform all checks locally using the curl workflows above so private or staging hostnames never leave the local environment. If the user explicitly authorizes third-party scanning for a public domain, pin the exact CLI package version before execution:

# Opt-in only (requires user approval for external package execution / domain disclosure):
npx @stealthmark/cli@0.1.6 audit https://example.com

Remediation Reference (Next.js Headers + Path Denial Middleware)

next.config.ts headers() attaches response headers only—it does not block access to sensitive paths. Pair next.config.ts with edge middleware.ts (or upstream Nginx/Cloudflare rules) to deny access to hidden repository metadata and lockfiles while preserving intentional public discovery endpoints:

// 1) next.config.ts — baseline perimeter response headers & source map hardening
import type { NextConfig } from "next";

// Add "; includeSubDomains" only after confirming every subdomain supports HTTPS.
// Add "; preload" only as an explicit decision per https://hstspreload.org/ requirements.
const HSTS_POLICY =
  process.env.HSTS_ENABLE_PRELOAD === "true"
    ? "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
    : process.env.HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS === "true"
      ? "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
      : "max-age=31536000";

const securityHeaders = [
  { key: "Strict-Transport-Security", value: HSTS_POLICY },
  { key: "X-Content-Type-Options", value: "nosniff" },
  { key: "X-Frame-Options", value: "DENY" },
  { key: "Referrer-Policy", value: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" },
  { key: "Permissions-Policy", value: "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" },
  { key: "Vary", value: "Accept-Encoding, Origin" },
];

const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
  poweredByHeader: false,
  productionBrowserSourceMaps: false,
  async headers() {
    return [{ source: "/:path*", headers: securityHeaders }];
  },
};

export default nextConfig;
// 2) middleware.ts — deny dotfiles, git metadata, registry configs, and lockfiles while preserving public /.well-known endpoints
import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";

const PUBLIC_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS = new Set([
  "/.well-known/security.txt",
  "/.well-known/agent.json",
]);

const BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES = [
  "/.git",
  "/.npmrc",
  "/.yarnrc.yml",
  "/package.json",
  "/package-lock.json",
  "/pnpm-lock.yaml",
  "/yarn.lock",
];

export function middleware(request: NextRequest) {
  const { pathname } = request.nextUrl;
  if (
    (pathname.startsWith("/.") && !PUBLIC_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS.has(pathname)) ||
    BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => pathname === prefix || pathname.startsWith(`${prefix}/`))
  ) {
    return new NextResponse(null, { status: 404 });
  }
  return NextResponse.next();
}