web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit
Passive, non-destructive web perimeter security auditing mapped to OWASP Top 10:2025 surface leads, CDN Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (X-Forwarded-Host), supply chain manifest exposure, git object dumping prevention (/.git/HEAD), cryptographic headers, and AI crawler boundary governance (llms.txt, robots.txt). Use when auditing production domains, configuring Cloudflare/Vercel/Nginx edge security, or preparing pre-launch perimeter checks.Web Perimeter Security Audit (OWASP Top 10:2025 Surface Leads)
Conduct non-destructive, deterministic perimeter security audits against web applications, APIs, and CDN edges. Map observable edge findings to relevant OWASP Top 10:2025 categories as perimeter leads, and verify fixes with reproducible checks before shipping to production.
Scope & Unverified Application-Layer Areas
External HTTP response headers, CDN cache behavior, crawler policies, and disclosure files only inspect the publicly observable edge perimeter. Passing this checklist does not establish full OWASP Top 10:2025 compliance. Always report the following application-layer areas as unverified by perimeter probing unless backed by separate code review and authenticated testing:
- Authorization & Object-Level Access Control (A01:2025): BOLA/IDOR, tenant isolation, and privilege escalation require authenticated multi-role integration tests (OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet).
- Authentication & Session Lifecycle (A07:2025): MFA enforcement, credential stuffing defenses, token rotation, and server-side session revocation cannot be proven from
Set-Cookieflags alone (OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet). - Injection & Business Logic Processing (A05 / A06:2025): SQL/NoSQL/command injection, SSRF, and race conditions require source analysis (SAST) and targeted DAST (OWASP Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet).
- Internal Security Logging & Alerting (A09:2025): Audit trail completeness, tamper resistance, and SIEM alerting must be verified inside the telemetry pipeline (OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet).
Important Safety Contract
- Never send destructive payloads, brute-force traffic, or unisolated cache-poisoning probes against shared production cache keys.
- Before sending any
X-Forwarded-HostorX-Forwarded-Schemeprobe against a live target, first prove query-key isolation using fresh, validated hexadecimal cache-busters (set -euo pipefail,CB_A=$(openssl rand -hex 8)andCB_B=$(openssl rand -hex 8)):- Fail closed before sending any request if
CB_AorCB_Bis empty, equal, or does not match^[0-9a-f]{16}$. - Send a clean request with
?__cb=${CB_A}(--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5), repeat the identical?__cb=${CB_A}request at most twice (max 3 requests total,--max-time 5each) to confirm a cacheHIT, and then send a single clean request with?__cb=${CB_B}(--max-time 5) and verify it produces a cacheMISS. - If
HITfollowed byMISSis not confirmed within those bounded attempts, abort the live probe and run it only against an isolated staging environment.
- Fail closed before sending any request if
- Use a private
mktemp -dworking directory withtrapcleanup for all captured headers and bodies; never write to predictable shared/tmpfilenames. - Verify real HTTP responses rather than relying on framework defaults; reverse proxies and CDNs frequently strip or override upstream headers.
- Treat
403 Forbiddenon directory roots (such as/.git/) as insufficient unless direct object paths (/.git/HEAD,/.git/config) also return404/403. - Keep all checks local by default (
curl/ standard system tools). Only invoke external CLIs or remote scorecard APIs when the user explicitly opts in and approves sharing the target hostname.
When to Activate
- Auditing a live domain or staging environment before launch
- Reviewing Cloudflare, Vercel, AWS CloudFront, Nginx, or Next.js middleware security configurations
- Investigating CDN Web Cache Poisoning (
X-Forwarded-Host,X-Forwarded-Scheme) or CORS origin reflection - Hardening supply chain artifacts (
package-lock.json,/.npmrc,/.yarnrc.yml, source maps) and AI crawler boundaries (llms.txt,robots.txt,security.txt)
Perimeter Audit Workflow
1. Exposed Artifacts, CORS & Cache Isolation Leads (Related to A01 / A02:2025)
- Direct Git Object & Config Artifact Exposure (
git-dumpervector):- Disabling directory indexing on
/.git/(403 Forbidden) does not prevent repository reconstruction if direct object paths remain readable. - Probe each path using a bounded, file-specific signature (
--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5) without printing sensitive contents:/.git/HEAD: check if status is200and the first line matches^ref: refs/or a 40-character hex SHA (^[0-9a-f]{40}$)./.git/config: check if status is200and the body contains[core]or a[remote "section header./docker-compose.yml: check if status is200and the body contains a top-levelservices:block.- Environment configuration paths (such as
/<dotenv-artifact>): check if status is200and lines match^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+=without<!DOCTYPEor<html, reporting only a boolean detection signal and never echoing secret values.
- Disabling directory indexing on
- CORS Arbitrary Origin Reflection:
- Send
Origin: https://evil-probe.invalidwith--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5. - If the response reflects
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil-probe.invalidtogether withAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, record it as a HIGH-priority perimeter lead. Verify whether the endpoint serves authenticated or non-public user data in a browser context before escalating to CRITICAL (public endpoints that return identical unauthenticated content regardless of cookies are a lower-severity misconfiguration).
- Send
- Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (Bounded Probe & Local Staging Fixture):
- Only after proving query-key isolation (
?__cb=${CB_A}reachesHITwithin 3 bounded requests while?__cb=${CB_B}returnsMISS) or on an isolated staging host, run the bounded probe inside a private temporary directory:set -euo pipefail CB_A="$(openssl rand -hex 8)" CB_B="$(openssl rand -hex 8)" if [[ ! "${CB_A}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ ]] || [[ ! "${CB_B}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ ]] || [[ "${CB_A}" == "${CB_B}" ]]; then echo "Fail closed: invalid cache-buster entropy" >&2 exit 1 fi WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" trap 'rm -rf "${WORK_DIR}"' EXIT TARGET_BASE="https://example.com/" # Step 1: Prove query-key isolation (max 3 attempts for HIT on CB_A, then MISS on CB_B) CACHE_HIT=0 for attempt in 1 2 3; do curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 -D "${WORK_DIR}/iso_a_headers.txt" -o /dev/null "${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_A}" if grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:\s*HIT|x-cache:\s*Hit|age:\s*[1-9])' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_a_headers.txt"; then CACHE_HIT=1 break fi done curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 -D "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt" -o /dev/null "${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_B}" if [[ "${CACHE_HIT}" -ne 1 ]] || ! grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:[[:space:]]*MISS([[:space:]]|$)|x-cache:[[:space:]]*Miss([[:space:]]|$))' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt" || grep -Eiq '^(cf-cache-status:[[:space:]]*HIT|x-cache:[[:space:]]*Hit|age:[[:space:]]*[1-9])' "${WORK_DIR}/iso_b_headers.txt"; then echo "Aborting live probe: query-key cache isolation not proven; use isolated staging." >&2 exit 1 fi # Step 2: Isolated GET probe on a fresh cache-buster key CB_PROBE="$(openssl rand -hex 8)" [[ "${CB_PROBE}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{16}$ && "${CB_PROBE}" != "${CB_A}" && "${CB_PROBE}" != "${CB_B}" ]] || exit 1 PROBE_URL="${TARGET_BASE}?__cb=${CB_PROBE}" curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 \ -D "${WORK_DIR}/probe_headers.txt" -o "${WORK_DIR}/probe_body.txt" "${PROBE_URL}" \ -H "X-Forwarded-Host: cache-probe.invalid" \ -H "X-Forwarded-Scheme: nothttps" # Step 3: Clean follow-up GET to the identical URL without probe headers curl -sS --connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5 \ -D "${WORK_DIR}/clean_headers.txt" -o "${WORK_DIR}/clean_body.txt" "${PROBE_URL}" - Flag MEDIUM (Unkeyed Input Reflection) if
cache-probe.invalidappears in${WORK_DIR}/probe_headers.txt(Location) or${WORK_DIR}/probe_body.txton the first request alone. - Escalate to HIGH (Confirmed Web Cache Poisoning) only when the subsequent clean follow-up request (
${WORK_DIR}/clean_headers.txtand${WORK_DIR}/clean_body.txt) is served from cache (CF-Cache-Status: HIT,X-Cache: Hit from cloudfront, orAge > 0) and replays the injectedcache-probe.invalidreflection or poisoned4xx/5xxstatus. - Self-Contained Local Staging Fixture (Positive Replay vs. Negative Control):
To validate your detection logic locally without touching external networks, run this loopback fixture:
python3 - << 'EOF' import http.server, threading, urllib.request STORE = {} class EdgeFixture(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, *args): pass def do_GET(self): mode, _, query = self.path.partition("?") xfh = self.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Host", "clean.example") # /vulnerable caches by query only (unkeyed X-Forwarded-Host) # /safe includes X-Forwarded-Host in the cache key (negative control) key = (mode, query) if mode == "/vulnerable" else (mode, query, xfh) if key in STORE: body, hit = STORE[key], "HIT" else: body = f"<link href='https://{xfh}/app.js'>".encode() STORE[key], hit = body, "MISS" self.send_response(200) self.send_header("CF-Cache-Status", hit) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), EdgeFixture) port = srv.server_port threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start() def check_path(path): url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}{path}?__cb=deadbeef01234567" req1 = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"X-Forwarded-Host": "cache-probe.invalid"}) urllib.request.urlopen(req1, timeout=3).read() resp2 = urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=3) body2 = resp2.read().decode() hit2 = resp2.headers.get("CF-Cache-Status") return hit2 == "HIT" and "cache-probe.invalid" in body2 assert check_path("/vulnerable") is True, "Expected positive replay detection on /vulnerable" assert check_path("/safe") is False, "Expected negative control to stay clean on /safe" srv.shutdown() print("Staging fixture verified: positive replay detected and negative control clean.") EOF
- Only after proving query-key isolation (
2. Software Supply Chain & Integrity Leads (Related to A03 / A08:2025)
- Public Lockfile & Registry Config Exposure:
- Verify that
/package.json,/package-lock.json,/pnpm-lock.yaml, and/yarn.lockreturn404or403in production so attackers cannot harvest your exact dependency tree (SBOM). - Explicitly probe
/.npmrcand/.yarnrc.ymlusing bounded, non-exfiltrating signatures (--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5): check whether HTTP status is200and lines match^(registry|@[a-z0-9_-]+:registry|//[^:]+:_authToken|npmScopes:|npmRegistries:|npmAuthToken:|nodeLinker:)without<!DOCTYPEor<html. Report only the HTTP status code and boolean detection result; never print configuration contents or token values.
- Verify that
- Production Source Maps & Subresource Integrity (SRI):
- Check whether production JavaScript bundles expose
.js.mapfiles containing original TypeScript/business logic. - Require
integrity="sha384-..."andcrossorigin="anonymous"on third-party<script>tags loaded from external CDNs.
- Check whether production JavaScript bundles expose
3. Transport & Browser Policy Leads (Related to A04 / A05:2025)
- Conditional Strict Transport Security (HSTS) & TLS Posture:
- Verify that plain
http://redirects immediately (301/308) tohttps://and that HTTPS responses includeStrict-Transport-Securitywith an appropriatemax-age(e.g.,max-age=31536000). - Treat
includeSubDomainsandpreloadas conditional deployment decisions, not universal defaults:- Only add
includeSubDomainsafter confirming that every subdomain under the registered domain supports valid HTTPS; otherwise browsers will refuse connections to HTTP-only internal or legacy subdomains. - Keep
preloadsubmission a separate, explicit operational decision after reviewing the HSTS preload requirements, because removal from browser preload lists takes months to propagate.
- Only add
- Verify that plain
- Content-Security-Policy (CSP) Evaluation:
- Verify that
Content-Security-Policydefinesdefault-src,script-src,object-src 'none',base-uri 'self', andframe-ancestors. - Flag
script-src 'unsafe-eval'independently whenever present, because cryptographic nonces ('nonce-...') and hashes ('sha256-...') only neutralize'unsafe-inline'and do not disableeval()or string-to-code execution. - Flag
script-src 'unsafe-inline'unless accompanied by'strict-dynamic'or per-response nonces/hashes (and nounsafe-inlinefallback in modern browsers).
- Verify that
4. Crawler Boundary & Session Cookie Leads (Related to A06 / A07:2025)
- AI Crawler & Agentic Boundary Governance:
- Verify whether
robots.txtexplicitly defines rules for AI crawlers (GPTBot,ClaudeBot,PerplexityBot,Google-Extended,CCBot) and whether/llms.txtor/.well-known/agent.jsondeclares machine-readable usage policies. - Because attackers routinely spoof
User-Agent: ChatGPT-UserorGooglebotto bypass naive WAF rules, never trustUser-Agentstrings alone: verify crawlers using Forward-Confirmed Reverse DNS (FCrDNS) (PTRlookup on the client IP followed by a forwardA/AAAAlookup confirming the IP matches the official domain), official published IP CIDR lists (e.g., OpenAI/Anthropic IP ranges), or cryptographic HTTP message signatures (RFC 9421Web Bot Auth).
- Verify whether
- Session Cookie Hardening (Perimeter Surface):
- Every
Set-Cookieheader carrying an authentication or session identifier must includeHttpOnlyandSecure. - Evaluate
SameSiteand lifetime against the application's architecture:- Default to
SameSite=Lax(orStrict) for first-party flows; only permitSameSite=None; Securewhen intentional cross-site embedding/federation is required and explicit anti-CSRF tokens or Fetch Metadata (Sec-Fetch-Site) checks are enforced. - Ephemeral browser-session cookies may intentionally omit
Max-AgeandExpiresso they clear on browser close; persistent cookies must set a boundedMax-AgeorExpiresappropriate to the session risk tier.
- Default to
- Every
5. Error Surface & Disclosure Policy Leads (Related to A09 / A10:2025)
- Fail-Closed Error Handling (No Stack Trace Leaks):
- Request a non-existent route (
/api/__probe_404_<random>) with--connect-timeout 3 --max-time 5and verify that the server returns a clean, minimal JSON or HTML error without leaking stack traces (java.sql.SQLException,PrismaClientKnownRequestError,Traceback,at Object.<anonymous>,/var/task/,node_modules/).
- Request a non-existent route (
- Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (
/.well-known/security.txt):- Verify RFC 9116 compliance (
Contact:and non-expiredExpires:fields) at/.well-known/security.txt.
- Verify RFC 9116 compliance (
Optional External Verification (Explicit Opt-In Only)
By default, perform all checks locally using the curl workflows above so private or staging hostnames never leave the local environment. If the user explicitly authorizes third-party scanning for a public domain, pin the exact CLI package version before execution:
# Opt-in only (requires user approval for external package execution / domain disclosure):
npx @stealthmark/cli@0.1.6 audit https://example.com
Remediation Reference (Next.js Headers + Path Denial Middleware)
next.config.ts headers() attaches response headers only—it does not block access to sensitive paths. Pair next.config.ts with edge middleware.ts (or upstream Nginx/Cloudflare rules) to deny access to hidden repository metadata and lockfiles while preserving intentional public discovery endpoints:
// 1) next.config.ts — baseline perimeter response headers & source map hardening
import type { NextConfig } from "next";
// Add "; includeSubDomains" only after confirming every subdomain supports HTTPS.
// Add "; preload" only as an explicit decision per https://hstspreload.org/ requirements.
const HSTS_POLICY =
process.env.HSTS_ENABLE_PRELOAD === "true"
? "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
: process.env.HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS === "true"
? "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
: "max-age=31536000";
const securityHeaders = [
{ key: "Strict-Transport-Security", value: HSTS_POLICY },
{ key: "X-Content-Type-Options", value: "nosniff" },
{ key: "X-Frame-Options", value: "DENY" },
{ key: "Referrer-Policy", value: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" },
{ key: "Permissions-Policy", value: "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" },
{ key: "Vary", value: "Accept-Encoding, Origin" },
];
const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
poweredByHeader: false,
productionBrowserSourceMaps: false,
async headers() {
return [{ source: "/:path*", headers: securityHeaders }];
},
};
export default nextConfig;
// 2) middleware.ts — deny dotfiles, git metadata, registry configs, and lockfiles while preserving public /.well-known endpoints
import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
const PUBLIC_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS = new Set([
"/.well-known/security.txt",
"/.well-known/agent.json",
]);
const BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES = [
"/.git",
"/.npmrc",
"/.yarnrc.yml",
"/package.json",
"/package-lock.json",
"/pnpm-lock.yaml",
"/yarn.lock",
];
export function middleware(request: NextRequest) {
const { pathname } = request.nextUrl;
if (
(pathname.startsWith("/.") && !PUBLIC_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS.has(pathname)) ||
BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => pathname === prefix || pathname.startsWith(`${prefix}/`))
) {
return new NextResponse(null, { status: 404 });
}
return NextResponse.next();
}