autonomous-agent-patterns

🕹️ Autonomous Agent Patterns

Design patterns for building autonomous coding agents, inspired by Cline and OpenAI Codex.

Detailed Guide

Read the detailed guide before executing this skill. It retains the complete procedure and reference material. Treat its safety, prerequisites, and validation requirements as mandatory. For focused work, load the relevant sections; for end-to-end work, read the guide completely.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

• Building autonomous AI agents
• Designing tool/function calling APIs
• Implementing permission and approval systems
• Creating browser automation for agents
• Designing human-in-the-loop workflows

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Limitations

• Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
• Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
• Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.

Authorization and implementation limits

These classes are conceptual fragments with missing imports/types/adapters/helpers, not working Cline/Codex/MCP implementations. response.to_history_message is an adapter contract to implement for the actual provider, not a standard SDK method. MCP clients need an actual transport/session and lifecycle; the Server(config) sketch is not a valid client handshake. Generated server code stays inert until reviewed.

Tool-name session approval authorizes too broadly: bind authorization to the concrete action, target, data and limits, reusing existing user authorization within scope. Read tools can expose secrets, and npm/python/node/git can execute arbitrary code; allowlisting their names or setting cwd/HOME does not sandbox them. Enforce filesystem/network/process boundaries outside model control, reject escaping/symlink paths, validate schemas and budget all tool/LLM calls and outputs. Approval UI and substring command checks alone provide no security boundary.

File edits need original-content conflict checks and atomic safe replacement; checkpoints require validated session IDs, private atomic files and a real workspace snapshot/restore strategy. Git status/ref alone cannot restore uncommitted content. Bound file sizes/context, exclude credentials and mark external content as untrusted data. Browser TreeWalker text is not an accessibility tree or guaranteed visible text; networkidle and approximate coordinates do not establish action correctness. Use current observed UI targets and verify results. No agent, tool, browser or generated server ran during review.