sickn33-antigravity-awesome-skills

attack-tree-construction

Build comprehensive attack trees to visualize threat paths. Use when mapping attack scenarios, identifying defense gaps, or communicating security risks to stakeholders.
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⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

  1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
  2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
  3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
  4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

AUTHORIZED USE ONLY: Use this skill only for authorized security assessments, defensive validation, or controlled educational environments.

Attack Tree Construction

Systematic attack path visualization and analysis.

Use this skill when

  • Visualizing complex attack scenarios
  • Identifying defense gaps and priorities
  • Communicating risks to stakeholders
  • Planning defensive investments or test scopes

Do not use this skill when

  • You lack authorization or a defined scope to model the system
  • The task is a general risk review without attack-path modeling
  • The request is unrelated to security assessment or design

Instructions

  • Confirm scope, assets, and the attacker goal for the root node.
  • Decompose into sub-goals with AND/OR structure.
  • Annotate leaves with cost, skill, time, and detectability.
  • Map mitigations per branch and prioritize high-impact paths.
  • If detailed templates are required, open resources/implementation-playbook.md.

Safety

  • Share attack trees only with authorized stakeholders.
  • Avoid including sensitive exploit details unless required.

Resources

  • resources/implementation-playbook.md for detailed patterns, templates, and examples.

Limitations

  • Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
  • Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
  • Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.

Model validity and metric limits

Validate a finite acyclic tree with unique IDs, nonempty AND/OR nodes and no children on leaves before recursion/export. The builder does not supply full validation, cycle detection or an enumeration cap; path products can grow exponentially. “Easiest” now uses the same max-difficulty convention as node aggregation, and detection uses a stated worst-step ordinal index, not a probability. The cost enum is an ordinal score; summing it does not produce dollars. Shared prerequisites, correlated detection, parallel time and resource reuse require a richer model.

Coverage means the fraction of enumerated modeled paths intersecting a supplied blocked-leaf set. A mitigation label is not evidence it fully blocks a leaf or that paths have equal likelihood; do not call the percentage real security coverage. Escape user-supplied diagram labels in the target grammar before rendering; the exporter sketches still assume reviewed safe labels. CVE references need actual affected-version/configuration evidence. No exploit, renderer or attack-tree implementation was executed during review.